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Abstract 
This paper addresses foreign direct investment (FDI) entry strategies of multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) by analysing both establishment mode (greenfield investment vs. 
acquisition) and ownership mode (wholly owned subsidiary vs. joint venture) strategies 
together. It contributes to extant IB literature by being one of the first to specifically address 
influences of economic freedom distance on both FDI establishment and ownership mode 
strategies of MNEs. The novel empirical sample consisting of 348 FDIs made by 146 Nordic 
(Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden) MNEs in the less researched transitional periphery 
of the European Union (EU), i.e. Common Wealth of Independent States (CIS) and South-
Eastern Europe (SEE), during 1990-2009 further enhances the contribution of our study. The 
study results revealed that high economic freedom distance leads to preference of greenfield 
investments and JVs by Nordic MNEs in the full sample. Further in depth analysis by 
dividing the sample into FDIs in the Russian Federation vs. other host economies lead to 
more interesting insights into the establishment and ownership mode strategies of Nordic 
MNEs. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Foreign market entry mode decisions are an important part of the international strategy of 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) and have been researched widely in the field of 
international business (IB) studies (e.g. Brouthers and Hennart, 2007; Slangen and Hennart, 
2007). These decisions are commonly segmented into equity based and non-equity based 
modes (Pan and Tse, 2000; Brouthers and Hennart, 2007). The equity based entry modes 
involve foreign direct investment (FDI) made by the MNEs (Dunning and Lundan, 2008; 
Demirbag et al., 2008) and involve detailed analyses of the trade-off between control and 
investment risk, as well as conformance to institutional requirements of host countries (e.g. 
Luo, 2001; Xu and Shenkar, 2002; Arslan and Larimo, 2011). MNEs face two important 
strategic decisions when they wish to enter new international markets using FDI mode. The 
first one is referred to as establishment mode strategy (Dikova and van Witteloostuijn, 2007; 
Arslan and Larimo, 2011), where MNEs, decide whether to acquire an existing enterprise 
(acquisition) or build a new start up (greenfield investment). The second one is referred to as 
ownership mode strategy where the level of equity ownership in a foreign subsidiary is 
determined, i.e. formation of a wholly owned subsidiary (WOS) or a joint venture (JV) with a 
local partner (e.g. Brouthers and Brouthers, 2000; Slangen and Hennart, 2007).  
 
IB Scholars have analysed these FDI strategies of MNEs using different theoretical and 
empirical approaches. Some past studies addressed the ownership mode strategy of MNEs by 
studying the choice between JVs or WOSs (e.g. Anderson and Gatignon, 1986; Luo, 2001; 
Xu et al., 2004; Brouthers and Hennart, 2007; Jung et al., 2008). Other IB scholars 
concentrated more on the establishment mode strategy of the MNEs (e.g. Hennart and Park, 
1993; Brouthers and Brouthers, 2000; Datta et al., 2002; Larimo, 2003; Shimizu et al., 2004; 
Slangen and Hennart, 2007; Demirbag et al., 2008; Arslan and Larimo, 2011). Finally, some 
IB studies have attempted to perform an in depth analysis of equity entry mode strategy by 
addressing the choice between joint ventures, acquisitions and greenfield investments by the 
MNEs (e.g. Kogut and Singh, 1988; Chang and Rosenzweig, 2001; Elango and Sambharya, 
2004; Dikova, 2012). An MNE’s subsidiary can be wholly or partially owned whether it 
creates a greenfield investment or acquires an existing firm, indicating that acquisitions can 
be partially and wholly owned as well (e.g. Jakobsen and Meyer, 2008; Arslan and Larimo, 
2012; Contractor et al., 2014). Moreover, it should be noted that each of the market entry 
mode strategies (full acquisitions, wholly owned greenfield investments, partial acquisitions 
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and JVs) offers specific benefits and risks for MNEs. Consequently, establishment and 
ownership mode strategies emerge as significant decisions for MNEs (Kulkarni, 2001; Chang 
and Rosenzweig, 2001; Harzing, 2002; Demirbag et al., 2008) because they are considerably 
inflexible and irreversible in nature due to the large financial and resource commitment 
involved (e.g. Elango and Sambharya, 2004; Dikova, 2012). Strikingly, while there may not 
be agreement on the actual rate of success/failure in various FDI establishment and 
ownership mode strategies (for instance, acquisitions, JVs and WOSs ), it is clear that far too 
many investments fail to deliver what was expected (e.g. Cartwright and Cooper, 1996; 
Schoenberg, 2006; Gomes et al., 2011; Weber et al., 2014). Therefore, studying and 
analysing both FDI establishment and ownership mode strategies together can offer useful 
insights and contribute to extending IB literature because they have been rather infrequently 
addressed together and in-depth in past IB studies.  
 
MNEs entering foreign markets using FDI mode encounter an important issue as each host 
country represents a unique institutional environment (North, 1990) which can influence their 
entry and operational strategies substantially (e.g. Peng, 2002, 2003; Estrin et al., 2009). The 
differences in institutional environments between home and host countries of MNEs and the 
impacts on their strategies have been addressed in past IB studies by the construct of 
institutional distance, which has been conceptualised and operationalised in a variety of ways 
(e.g. Xu and Shenkar, 2002; Xu et al., 2004; Gaur and Lu, 2007; Estrin et al., 2009; Arslan 
and Larimo, 2010, 2011; Dikova, 2012). 
   
It needs to be stressed that an important characteristic of institutional environments of the 
host countries relates to the differing levels of economic freedom in their economies (North 
and Thomas, 1973; North, 1981, 1990). The level of economic freedom of a country has been 
linked to its economic development as well as to the increased FDI inflows and activities of 
the MNEs (Cole, 2003). Economic freedom in a country can be defined by its key ingredients 
which are “personal choice, voluntary exchange coordinated by markets, freedom to enter 
and compete in markets, and protection of persons and their property from aggression by 
others” (Gwartney et al., 2008: 3). For instance, the study by Ford et al. (1998) focusing on 
the macro level examined the link between economic freedom (a measure of government 
intervention) and the penetration of three durable goods (televisions, radios and automobiles) 
across countries and found a significant relationship between greater amounts of economic 
freedom and penetration for these three products. However, the factors concerning economic 
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freedom in different countries have been rather infrequently researched in the management 
and IB studies addressing the strategies of MNEs in their international markets.  DiRienzo et 
al.  (2007), Demirbag et al. (2011) and Arslan and Larimo (2012) are examples of the very 
few studies that used some aspects of economic freedom to analyse different IB strategies of 
MNEs. 
 
It has been referred earlier that the variance in levels of economic freedom in host countries 
has been found to have strong linkages with FDI flows; we expect that this variance may also 
impact important FDI related strategies and choices of the investing MNEs. Therefore, we 
argue that the economic freedom distance (i.e. difference in levels of economic freedom in 
the home and host countries of MNEs) can potentially influence both FDI establishment and 
ownership mode choices.  The literature review of past management and IB research reveals 
that so far no study (at least to our knowledge) has specifically analysed the impacts of 
economic freedom distance on both establishment mode and ownership mode strategies of 
the MNEs together. Therefore, this paper aims to enrich the extant IB and management 
literature by analysing these important FDI strategies of MNEs together, using a relatively 
new construct of economic freedom distance.  
 
 The empirical sample of the current study is based on the FDIs made by Nordic Firms in host 
economies that are located in the transitional periphery of the European Union (EU) i.e. 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and South-East Europe (SEE). The importance 
of transition economies as investment locations for the MNEs has hugely increased over the 
last decade (Meyer and Peng, 2005; Bitzenis, 2009). With economic liberalization of Central 
and Eastern European countries (CEE), and former Soviet Union republics, vast market and 
production opportunities opened up for the MNEs (Bitzenis, 2009). A number of IB studies 
have focused on the CEE area in general to analyse different aspects of FDI market entry 
mode strategies of MNEs (see e.g. Meyer, 2002; Peng, 2003; Meyer and Peng, 2005; Dikova 
and van Witteloostuijn, 2007; Karhunen et al., 2008; Jakobsen and Meyer, 2008; Arslan and 
Larimo, 2010; Dikova, 2012; Bitzenis, 2004, 2006, 2009, 2014). Moreover, ex-socialist 
countries represent two distinct categories; the Baltic States, Poland, Hungary, the Czech 
Republic, Slovenia and Slovakia have been more successful in their transition to market 
economies and are considered part of developed European economies since joining the 
European Union in 2004 (Zweynert and Goldschmidt, 2006). However, CIS and SEE 
countries like Russia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Ukraine, Romania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
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Croatia, Serbia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have been less successful in their transition to 
market economy and significant barriers still exist for foreign firms’ entry and operations 
(Meyer, 2005; Shiells, 2003 Zweynert and Goldschmidt, 2005,2006, Bitzenis, 2009; EBRD, 
2013).  Although Romania and Bulgaria joined the EU in 2007, significant problems in 
relation to institutional development, economic freedom and transparency exist there (e.g. 
Dumitriu and Stefanescu, 2008; EBRD, 2013).  
 
The term transitional periphery of the EU was coined by sociologists and economists a 
decade ago (see e.g. Totev, 2002; Barry, 2004; Galego et al., 2004; Balkir et al., 2013) and 
includes countries located in territories bordering core EU economies in the SEE region as 
well as ex-soviet states that are members of CIS (Demekas et al., 2005, 2007; Aslund, 2012; 
Estrin and Uvalic, 2013, 2014). These economies are generally characterized by significant 
challenges for investing foreign MNEs, such as macroeconomics and political instability, 
problematic legal systems, official corruption, crime and mafia, lack of information about 
market conditions and uncertainty, and lack of a business culture by local employees and 
local partners (Demekas et al., 2005, 2007; Bitzenis, 2009; Estrin and Uvalic, 2013, 2014). 
These challenges resulted primarily from the political instability in the Balkans during the 
1990s, as well as the slow pace of transition combined with high corruption in economies like 
those of Bulgaria, Romania, Belarus, Ukraine and Russia (Bitzenis and Marangos, 2007; 
Aslund, 2012; Bitzenis, 2009; Estrin and Uvalic, 2013, 2014; Treisman, 2014). However, 
despite the challenges, there has been an increasing interest by western MNEs in these 
economies depicted by increased FDI over the years due to prospects for future market and 
business growth, as well as location advantages of presence in low cost economies close to 
the EU (Bitzenis and Vlachos, 2010; Treisman, 2014).   
 
It needs to be further stressed that SEE and CIS States have been rather ignored in transition 
economy specific market entry and IB studies because those studies mostly concentrated on 
CEE countries like Poland, Hungary, Baltic States, Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Slovenia 
that became part of the EU in 2004. Moreover, in many of the earlier market entry studies, 
the Russian Federation has been included in the sample of CEE states with other countries 
like Poland, Hungary, Baltic states (e.g. Meyer, 2002; Meyer and Peng 2005; Arslan and 
Larimo 2010; Dikova, 2012). We argue that based on the important indicators of transition to 
market economy and the level of economic freedom, the Russian Federation should be 
included in analysis with other transitional periphery economies of CIS and SEE (Gwartney 
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et al., 2008, 2009; IMD, 2010). Therefore, the current paper aims to concentrate on FDIs in 
host countries located in this transitional periphery of developed and advanced European 
economies. The investing MNEs in the current study’s empirical sample come from small, 
open and highly internationalised Nordic economies (i.e. Finland, Sweden, Norway and 
Denmark). The home countries of the investing MNEs in the current study further 
characterise a developed institutional environment representing high levels of economic 
freedom (Gwartney et al., 2009). It is expected that this relatively unique empirical context 
has the potential to offer newer insights to the literature concerning establishment and 
ownership mode strategies of MNEs, as it also uses the construct of economic freedom 
distance, which is an important and rather infrequently researched construct in the 
management and IB studies. 
 
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND STUDY HYPOTHESES 
 
Economic freedom has been referred to by economic historians as an important pre-requisite 
of economic activity, growth and development in different societies and countries (e.g. North 
and Thomas, 1973; North, 1990).  The previous research indicates that increased economic 
freedom in the emerging economies is a positive determinant of FDI inflows and it should 
also be a key priority of the policy makers in those countries (e.g. Krugman, 1991; Cole, 
2003). Further on, Cole (2003) found that the countries with greater economic freedom 
(which offer the protection of privately operating markets and of private property with 
minimal government interference) receive increased FDI inflows over a longer time period, 
in comparison with the countries with lower levels of economic freedom. As has been stated 
earlier, economic freedom in a country has been shown to have strong linkages with 
increased FDI inflows and activities by MNEs in those economies (Krugman, 1991; Meyer et 
al., 2009). Therefore, it can be expected that the difference in levels of economic freedom 
between home and host countries of MNEs (i.e. economic freedom distance) can also 
influence both the establishment and ownership mode strategies of the MNEs. 
 
Economic freedom distance between home and host countries of an MNE can be a source of 
uncertainty for the investing firm in a new environment (Demirbag et al., 2011) and can lead 
to additional costs for the investing MNE’s operations in that particular market. These costs 
result from unfamiliarity hazards as referred to in some earlier management and IB studies 
(e.g. Gaur and Lu, 2007; Demirbag et al., 2011). Unfamiliarity hazards emerge from the 
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investing MNEs’ lack of knowledge about the host country institutions (Demirbag et al., 
2011) and they are also a major hurdle in managing a subsidiary (e.g. Delios and Henisz, 
2003; Gaur and Lu, 2007). The weakness of market economy institutions in any country has 
been mentioned as a major source of these problems for the investing MNEs (Meyer et al., 
2009; Demirbag et al., 2011). The weakness of market economy institutions in the host 
countries is also evidenced by the presence of a low level of economic freedom there 
(Gwartney et al., 2008). Economic freedom distance can be referred to as a manifestation of 
the differences in terms of strength of market economy institutions between home and host 
countries of MNEs (see e.g. Demirbag et al., 2011). As referred earlier, both establishment 
and ownership mode represent important market entry mode strategies of MNEs and the 
difference in levels of economic freedom between home and host country is expected to 
affect them significantly. Therefore, the specific discussion on the influence of economic 
freedom distance on these strategies of MNEs is presented as follows.  
 
Economic Freedom Distance and FDI Establishment Mode Strategy of MNEs 
 
Previous management and IB research indicates that if an MNE intends to internationalise by 
acquiring a local firm, in a distant market with high institutional differences, it often will face 
governmental intervention in the organizational policies and strategies due to differences in 
antitrust regulations (e.g. Schneper and Guillen, 2004; Estrin et al., 2009).  It has also been 
found empirically that MNEs tend to establish greenfield subsidiaries, rather than acquisitions 
when the country differences are higher (e.g. Kogut and Singh, 1988; Cho and Padmanabhan, 
1995). High differences between home and host countries have further been found by some 
earlier studies to increase management problems in acquisitions ies (e.g. Child et al., 2001; 
Datta et al., 2002; Arslan and Larimo, 2011). Moreover, the transfer of organizational 
practices, policies and strategies to an acquired business unit operating under local rules in a 
distant market can also be problematic for the acquiring MNEs (e.g. Kostova and Roth, 
2002). As noted by Slangen (2013), often political constraints in host countries imply policy 
uncertainty for MNEs.  Slangen (2013) further mentions that acquisitions require MNEs to 
obtain the much-needed external assets immediately upon entry, while greenfield subsidiaries 
allow them to buy these assets sequentially, causing greenfield subsidiaries temporarily to 
have a real options advantage over acquisitions, if policy uncertainty resolves unfavourably 
after the initiation of an entry. Moreover, Brouthers and Dikova (2010) mention that 
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acquisitions are a good choice only when firms enter markets containing a low level of 
uncertainty and when these firms possess acquisition-based strategic flexibility.  
 
It has been established in previous literature that acquisition activity is higher in those 
economies where investor protection is high (e.g. Baums, 1993; Höpner, 2005), and where 
flexibility is allowed for the required restructuring of acquired firms, so that organisational 
practices can be transferred to the subsidiary (e.g. Jackson, 2005; Estrin et al., 2009). 
Previous studies have also found that internal conformity is difficult to achieve through 
acquisitions, while it is relatively easy to realise through greenfield investments (Datta et al., 
2002). Furthermore, Tan (2009) has found that that the post-entry growth of acquisitions is 
positively associated with weak and codifiable interdependence within the MNE’s network, 
whereas the post-entry growth of greenfield investments is positively associated with strong 
and complex interdependence.  
 
In previous studies concentrating on countries located in the transitional periphery of SEE 
and CIS, indicators like economic growth, policy framework and positive changes in business 
environment like privatization (i.e. better economic freedom) have been found have a strong 
influence on FDI flows (Kekic, 2005; Aslund, 2012).  In a similar vein, some studies 
examined the effects of transition and of political instability on FDI flows to transitional 
periphery economies. Their results show strong linkage of increased FDI flow to reforms, 
including labour market low costs and flexibility (Bitzenis, 2009; Bitzenis and Marangos, 
2007). We link these findings with FDI establishment mode strategies of investing Nordic 
MNEs in the transitional periphery of the EU. The economies of the transitional periphery 
represent totally different approaches to work culture and labour management compared to 
developed western economies (Aslund, 2012). For example transitional periphery economies 
which were part of the former Soviet Union (e.g. Russian Federation, Ukraine, Belarus, 
Central Asian economies etc.) inherited work practices based on a state focused bureaucratic 
approach and their institutional context is also very challenging (Welter and Smallbone, 
2011). On the other hand, in SEE economies, transition has been very turbulent due to civil 
war in former Yugoslavian republics as well as the persistent problem of high levels of 
corruption in Bulgaria and Romania despite being EU members (Uvalic, 2010). Therefore, 
managers of such firms have difficulties in adjusting to a competitive work environment 
driven by a western managerial approach (Alas et al., 2012).  
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These differences can be expected to cause problems as organisational structures and 
practices in the acquired firm tend to be difficult to change due to inertia (Datta and Grant, 
1990; Dikova et al., 2010), and this inertia is expected to be even higher in the case of 
transitional periphery economies. For example, Garcia et al. (2009) mention that considerable 
inertia is created in firms located in transition economies, due to a legacy of inefficient 
managerial approaches as well as protectionism. Smallbone and Welter (2012) further 
mention that in CIS economies, slow and problematic institutional reforms along with a 
difficult political context have made local organisations risk averse, and this leads to higher 
inertia and resistance to changes. In this situation, the investing MNEs would need to work 
out how the resources of the acquired firm could be employed into productive uses that are in 
line with its own objectives (Contractor et al., 2014); this situation also causes an additional 
cost burden for the MNE (Meyer and Altenborg, 2008). However, the greenfield subsidiary 
establishment in a host transitional periphery economy can offer investing Nordic firms an 
option to create an organization that is more similar to the parent organization (Drogendijk 
and Andersson, 2013). Moreover, using this strategy, Nordic MNEs can also recruit and train 
suitable human resources to develop practices that fit with the MNEs’ international strategy 
as well as the local regulations (Höpner, 2005; Estrin et al., 2009; Arslan and Larimo, 2011). 
Therefore, we hypothesise that: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Nordic MNEs prefer greenfield investments over acquisitions in their 
establishment mode strategy in the transitional periphery host economies with high economic 
freedom distance.  
  
Economic Freedom Distance and FDI Ownership Mode Strategy of MNEs 
 
Majority versus minority control i.e. ownership mode strategy of investing foreign MNEs is 
highly regulated in most economies (Xu and Shenkar 2002; Xu et al., 2004). Consequently, 
level of economic freedom in an economy influences the choice between JVs and WOSs by 
those MNEs. Based on the examination of foreign subsidiaries’ financial data in China for 
1998–2006, Chang et al. (2013) found strong evidence that WOSs outperform JVs with local 
partners in industries characterised by high levels of intangible assets such as technology or 
brand. According to Beamish and Lupton (2009), JVs help firms to access new markets, 
knowledge, capabilities and other resources, but can be challenging to manage, largely 
because they are owned by two or more parent companies that may have competing or 
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incongruent goals, differences in management style and, in the case of international business, 
additional complexities associated with differing government policies and business practices.  
 
Demirbag et al. (2010), investigating the impact of institutional variables and transaction cost 
determinants on the foreign equity structure (namely choice between WOS, dyadic JV and 
multi-partner JV) in an emerging economy (Turkey), found that research and development 
(R&D) intensity, cultural distance, location of affiliate, affiliate size, political risk and 
corruption perception distances are particularly important in determining the choice of the 
afore-mentioned types of affiliate structure. An important issue highlighted in the earlier 
literature relates to the fact that the countries (and emerging/transition economies specially) 
should attempt to remove the restrictions on the investments by the foreign MNEs, as this 
would result in higher entry rates and increased investment flows by them (Shiells, 2003; 
Flores and Aguilera, 2007; Khanna and Palepu, 2010). The governmental restrictions on the 
market entry and operational strategies of the foreign MNEs result in pressures on them only 
to form JVs (Deng, 2003). Moreover, Child and Tsai (2005) found out that when firms 
operate under favourable external circumstances, they tend to commit more resources to that 
host economy. Therefore, the host countries representing a high level of economic freedom 
can provide a favourable institutional context for MNEs, which in turn can motivate investing 
MNEs to show more commitment and form WOSs rather than JVs.  
  
It has been mentioned earlier that transitional periphery economies increase uncertainty for 
investing MNEs due to problems associated with institutional infrastructure (low levels of 
economic freedom) as well socioeconomic dynamics (Bitzenis, 2009; Demekas et al., 2005, 
2007; Aslund, 2012; Estrin and Uvalic, 2013, 2014). To counter this uncertainty and 
ambiguity that arise from high economic freedom distance for investing Nordic MNEs, JV 
formation with an established and reliable local partner can be helpful. Along with countering 
uncertainty, JV formation with a local partner is also useful to overcome unfamiliarity 
hazards (Demirbag et al., 2011). Moreover, high economic freedom distance is also expected 
to put pressures on the Nordic MNEs by increasing their establishment and operational costs. 
This issue becomes relevant in this case because investing Nordic MNEs originating from a 
developed market economy are entering economies located in the transitional periphery of the 
EU, where the level of economic freedom is low due large government size, high taxation, 
less reliable financial structure and barriers on the foreign firm’s operations and strategies 
(e.g. Tridimasa and Winer, 2005; Demekas et al., 2007; Bitzenis, 2009; Aslund, 2012; Estrin 
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and Uvalic, 2013, 2014). We argue that in such cases, the investing Nordic MNEs would 
prefer to form JVs with local partners to share additional costs, despite problems associated 
with JV management in transition economies (Li and Zhang, 2007; Kobernyuk et al., 2014).  
 
The choice of JVs as an ownership strategy in transitional periphery economies with high 
economic freedom distance can further help investing Nordic MNEs to develop networking 
and relationships with key local players (e.g. Meyer, 2002; Kobernyuk et al., 2014). Finally, 
JV formation can offer an opportunity to align the interests of the foreign MNE and the host 
government (Meyer 2002, 2004; Chen et al., 2009), which is required in transition economies 
of SEE and CIS. Based on the discussion, we hypothesise that: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Nordic MNEs prefer JVs over WOSs in their ownership mode strategy in the 
transition periphery host economies with high economic freedom distance.  
 
3. RESEARCH METHODS 
3.1 Variables and Data Sources 
 
Dependent Variable: The dependent variables of the study are establishment mode strategy 
and ownership mode strategy. The dummy variable establishment mode is coded 1 for 
acquisition and 0 for greenfield investment. The dummy variable ownership mode is coded 0 
for JV and 1 for WOS. The data for these variables and other firm and industry level control 
variables are based on the internal FDI database built on published data on the investment 
(stock exchange news, press releases, company websites, Thomson One, and/or the annual 
reports) of investing Nordic MNEs. One of the authors has been following FDI strategies of 
Nordic MNEs for the past three decades and the information from this internal FDI database 
has been updated continuously during this time period.  
 
Economic Freedom Distance: The key independent variable of the study, i.e. economic 
freedom distance, is based on economic freedom of the world annual reports (Gwartney et al., 
2008, 2009). Economic freedom of the world annual reports measure a country’s openness to 
international business and trade by measuring and ranking the country along five major 
dimensions/pillars i.e. Size of government, Legal structure and security of property rights, 
Access to sound money, Freedom to trade internationally and Regulations of credit, labour 
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and business. These pillars are further divided into different categories and finally a country’s 
summary rating scores (1-10) are developed. 
 
Economic freedom of the world reports use the data from World Economic Forum, World 
Bank, International Monetary Fund, United Nations and World Trade Organization to 
measure these variables (see e.g. Gwartney et al., 2008, 2009). A higher country score 
represents openness of the economy to international business, presence of strong market 
institutions, ease of business for foreign firms and sound financial and fiscal policies. The 
data from economic freedom of the world reports have been used widely in studies in the 
fields of international and institutional economics and international political economy studies 
(see e.g. Cole, 2003; Feldman and Slemrod, 2009). Moreover, DiRienzo et al. (2007) and 
Arslan and Larimo (2012) also used this source to study different aspects of international 
management strategies of the firms. Therefore, it can be said that economic freedom of the 
world annual reports are a reliable source for the analysis of the country level differences and 
their impacts on different economic and business issues. Following Kogut and Singh’s (1988) 
formula for cultural distance, the study uses a similar formula for the calculation of economic 
freedom distance, as it incorporates the variation in the sample along different dimensions, 
which is a more realistic incorporation of distance rather than merely calculating the 
differences in country scores. The economic freedom distance in our study is calculated as 
follows: 
EFDj = 5/
5
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


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

i
i
II
ViKij  
where EFDj is economic freedom distance between country j and 
Finland/Sweden/Denmark/Norway, Iij is country j’s score on the ith economic freedom 
dimension/pillar , IiK is the score of Finland/Sweden/Denmark/Norway on this dimension, 
and Vi is the variance of the score of the dimension. Finally, it is important to mention that 
this paper uses economic freedom distance values in the year of investment or the nearest 
available year, rather than using single values for the FDI strategy analysis during a time 
period of 20 years. (1990-2009).  
 
Control variables: In order to analyse the effects of the independent variables on the 
establishment mode choice in a comprehensive manner, we control for selected investing 
firm, investment, and host country specific variables that have been found significant in past 
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IB studies. The operationalizations of the control variables, and examples of earlier studies 
where similar operationalizations have been used, are presented in the following Table 1. 
 
----Please insert Table 1 about here---- 
 
3.2 Study Sample Description 
The empirical sample for the current study consists of 348 FDIs made in the manufacturing 
sector by 146 Nordic firms (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden) in host economies 
located in the transitional periphery of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and 
South-Eastern Europe during 1990-2009.  The host countries in the study sample include 
Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Romania, Russia, 
Serbia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. The study sample includes firms with large international 
experience (e.g. over 150 international investments) as well as firms with very little 
experience (no previous foreign investment). Similar heterogeneity can be observed in the 
case of host country experience, where some firms had high previous experience (highest 11 
years) while for some others, this was their first investment in that particular country.  The 
key characteristics of the study sample are summarised in Table 2.  
 
----Please insert Table 2 about here---- 
Statistical Method: The dependent variables of the study, i.e. establishment mode choice 
and ownership mode choice, are dichotomous. Therefore, stepwise binomial logistic 
regression is used to analyse the impacts of control and independent variables on FDI 
establishment and ownership mode choices of MNEs. The use of this statistical approach is 
justified by the fact that logistic regression techniques have the ability to incorporate a wide 
range of diagnostics, the dichotomous characteristic of the dependent variables of the study, 
and the mix of continuous and categorical independent variables used in this study (Hair et 
al., 1998). Binomial logistic regression analysis has been frequently used in the studies 
addressing FDI establishment mode strategy (e.g. Larimo, 2003; Dikova and van 
Witteloostuijn, 2007; Dikova et al., 2010; Arslan and Larimo, 2011) and ownership mode 
strategy of MNEs (e.g. Anderson and Gatignon, 1986; Padmanabhan and Cho, 1996; Hennart 
and Larimo, 1998; Kaynak et al., 2007; Arslan and Larimo, 2010; Dikova, 2012).  Therefore, 
it has proved to be a useful statistical technique to analyse both establishment and ownership 
mode choices of MNEs in different IB studies and this study also employs it.  
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Binomial logistic regression is used to test the hypotheses because both dependent variables 
are dichotomous. The binomial logistic regression model is formally expressed as 
P (yi=1) = 1/(1+ exp (-a-XiB)) 
Where yi is the dependent variable, Xi  is the vector of independent variables for the ith 
observation, a is the intercept parameter and B is the vector of regression coefficients 
(Amemiya, 1981). The recent version of SPSS, i.e. PASW 21, is used for the binomial 
regression analysis in this study. It should be noted that separate tests are conducted for FDI 
establishment and ownership mode strategies in this study. In the case of establishment mode 
choice, the dependent variable has the value 1 if the establishment mode choice is acquisition. 
Therefore a positive regression coefficient indicates that a particular variable increases the 
probability of acquisition in establishment mode choice. Moreover, in the case of ownership 
mode choice, the dependent variable has the value 1 if the ownership mode choice is WOS. 
Therefore a positive regression coefficient indicates that a particular variable increases the 
probability of WOS formation in the ownership mode choice by MNEs.   
 
4. RESULTS  
 
A correlation analysis is conducted before logistic regression tests (see Appendix 1) in order 
to detect any multicollinearity among independent variables. Following Belsley et al. (1980) 
and Pallant (2007), additional multicollinearity diagnostics (tolerance and variance inflation 
factor (VIF)) were also conducted. According to Wetherill (1986), the VIF values for 
independent and control variables used in regression analysis should not exceed 10. In our 
study, the VIF values are lower than 4 and consequently, any potential collinearity is not 
expected to influence the results of logistic regression analysis. 
 
Table 3 displays the results of binomial regression analysis for establishment mode strategy 
of Nordic MNEs in the transitional periphery of CIS and SEE. The explanatory power of all 
the statistical models of the study is good, as their chi-square (χ²) values are significant at 
p≤0.01 level. The predictive ability of the statistical models can be assessed by the correct 
classification rate. Moreover, the statistical models of the study have a higher correct 
classification rate than the chance rate of 50.1%, which is calculated using the proportional 
chance criterion, defined as a2 + (1-a) 2, where a is the proportion of acquisitions (47.1%) in 
our sample. The regression models show the correct classification rates from 65.7% to 
66.4%; therefore they show 15.6% to 16.3% improvement in the classification rates of the 
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models. Finally, satisfactory Nagelkerke R2 values (0.164, 0.169 and 0.179) show the 
predictive capability of all regression models that is similar to many past IB studies. It is also 
important to mention that along with doing the regression analysis for the full sample, we 
have also divided the sample on the basis of FDIs made in Russia vs. FDIs made in other 
transitional periphery countries, in order to perform detailed analysis as well as observe 
difference/similarities between these two sub-samples. 
 
----Please insert Table 3 about here---- 
 
In Table 3, Model 1 shows the logistic regression estimates for control and independent 
variables for the full sample, Model 2 for only FDIs made in Russia, and Model 3 for FDIs 
made in other transitional periphery countries excluding Russia. The results show that in the 
full sample, host country experience (p≤0.05), host country risk (p≤0.1), economic growth in 
host country (p≤0.05), cultural distance (p≤0.05) and Finland dummy (p≤0.1) are significant 
control variables. An interesting result concerns the non-significance of international 
experience, and the significance of host country experience of investing MNEs. The host 
countries in the transitional periphery started to open up for foreign FDI and MNE activities 
after 1990 and represented unusual characteristics of transformation to market economy 
(Bitzenis, 2009; Aslund, 2012). Hence, we believe that the general international experience of 
investing Nordic MNEs does not have the same level of importance as in other markets. As a 
result, it can be anticipated that previous host country specific experience provides MNEs 
with knowledge about the potential good acquisition targets representing established and 
successful local firms in certain industries and business sectors (Meyer and Altenborg, 2008). 
Prior IB literature mentions that practices and routines of acquired firms offer certain 
advantages to the MNEs (Shimizu et al., 2004; Contractor et al., 2014), especially when the 
host country represents a very different environment like transitional periphery economies.  
Therefore, such practices and strategies of the acquired firm can provide strategic advantages 
(e.g. Barkema and Schijven, 2008) to the Nordic MNEs and may offset certain influences of 
economic freedom distance. 
 
The results further show that high economic growth leads to choice of acquisition, while high 
cultural distance leads to choice of greenfield investment in the transitional periphery 
economies of CIS and SEE by Nordic MNEs. It has been mentioned by earlier IB scholars 
that cultural distance makes the integration of management practices of acquired firm 
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difficult (Kogut and Singh, 1988; Dikova et al., 2010) and can result in communication 
problems, leading to low performance and operational difficulties (Harzing, 2002; Meyer and 
Altenborg, 2008; Dikova et al., 2010). These problems can lead to the preference of 
greenfield investment by investing MNEs, in order to achieve smooth and fast application of 
management practices developed and used in the home market (Child et al., 2001; Arslan and 
Larimo, 2011).  The host countries of the transitional periphery in the current study come 
from very different national and professional cultural backgrounds compared to Nordic 
countries (Aslund, 2012). Therefore, the preference of greenfield investments over 
acquisitions by Nordic MNEs is logical in order to achieve internal conformity and fast 
transfer of organization practices to the subsidiaries in the transitional periphery of CIS and 
SEE.  
 
The detailed analysis, produced by dividing the sample into two sub samples (FDIs in Russia 
vs. FDIs in other countries) also shows similar influences of control variables on FDI 
establishment mode strategy of Nordic MNEs. However, we can observe that Finnish MNEs 
tended to prefer greenfield investments over acquisitions in case of investments in Russian 
Federation compared to other transitional periphery economies. This finding can be explained 
by referring to specific context of Russia i.e. restrictions on acquisitions in many industries, 
lack of proper acquisition targets and regulative hindrances in post-acquisition restructuring.  
The results further show that for the main independent variables of the study, economic 
freedom distance is significant at p≤0.05 level, and the regression coefficient indicates that 
high economic freedom distance leads to the choice of greenfield investment as hypothesised. 
Previous studies concentrating on economies located in the transitional periphery of SEE and 
CIS found strong linkage of increased FDI flow to economic freedom specific reforms, 
including low labour market costs and flexibility (Bitzenis, 2009; Bitzenis and Marangos, 
2007). We link these findings with FDI establishment mode strategies of Nordic MNEs in the 
transitional periphery of the EU. Transitional periphery economies represent a very different 
approach to work culture and labour management compared to developed western economies 
(Aslund, 2012). Hence, these differences could potentially cause problems; organizational 
structures and practices in the acquired firms tend to be difficult to change due to inertia 
(Datta and Grant, 1990; Dikova et al., 2010), and this inertia is expected to be higher in the 
case of transitional periphery economies. In this situation, the investing MNEs would need to 
work out how the resources of the acquired firm could be employed into the productive uses 
that are in line with its own objectives (Contractor et al., 2014); this also causes an additional 
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cost burden for the MNE (Meyer and Altenborg, 2008). However, the greenfield subsidiary 
can offer the Nordic MNEs an option to create an organisation that is more similar to the 
parent organization (Drogendijk and Andersson, 2013). Moreover, investing Nordic MNEs 
can still be sensitive to the local environment as they can recruit and train suitable local 
employees in line with practices that fit with the MNEs’ international strategy as well as the 
local regulations (Höpner, 2005; Estrin et al., 2009; Arslan and Larimo, 2011). Therefore, we 
receive support for Hypothesis 1 of the study.  
 
 Table 4 shows the results of binomial regression analysis for ownership mode strategy of 
Nordic MNEs in the transitional periphery of CIS and SEE. The explanatory power of all the 
statistical models of the study is good, as their chi-square (χ²) values are significant at p<0.01 
level. Moreover, the predictive ability of the statistical models can be assessed by the correct 
classification rate. The statistical models for ownership mode choice have a higher correct 
classification rate than the chance rate of 53.4%, which is calculated using the proportional 
chance criterion, which is defined as a2 + (1-a) 2, where a is the proportion of WOSs (36.8%) 
in our sample. The regression models show correct classification rates from 71.8% to 73%; 
therefore showing 18.4% to 19.4% improvement in the classification rates of the models. 
Lastly, good Nagelkerke R2 values (0.300, 0.311, and 0.400) further strengthen the 
significance of the predictive capability of the regression models.   
 
The results of the full sample regression model in Table 4 depicts that control variables 
including parent MNE size (p≤0.1), host country risk (p≤0.05), economic growth in host 
country (p≤0.05), timing of investment (p≤0.01), Finland dummy (p≤0.01) and Sweden 
dummy (p≤0.01) are significant. The results show that large Nordic MNEs preferred the 
formation of WOSs in the ownership strategy in the transitional periphery countries of CIS 
and South-Eastern Europe. The regression coefficients further show that host country risk is a 
significant variable for ownership mode choice and Nordic MNEs preferred JV formations 
when the level of risk was higher in the host transition economies. Previous IB studies also 
show that high host country risk is associated with the adoption of entry modes involving 
lower costs and resource commitments (Anderson and Gatignon, 1986; Brouthers and 
Brouthers, 2003). Therefore, JVs have been found as a preferred choice for the MNEs, which 
is same as our finding (e.g. Hill et al., 1990; Brouthers and Brouthers, 2003; Larimo and 
Arslan, 2013).  
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----Please insert Table 4 about here---- 
 
It can be further observed that high economic growth in the host country leads to the 
preference of WOSs by the Nordic MNEs. We expect Nordic MNEs to take advantage of 
high economic growth and market potential offered in transitional periphery economies (e.g. 
Aslund, 2012) despite risks and uncertainties.  Many of the host economies in SEE and CIS 
like Russia, Bulgaria, Romania and Kazakhstan depicted a commendable growth rate 
especially in the latter half of the study time period (UNCTAD, 2013). Therefore, formation 
of WOSs by Nordic MNEs in such cases is understandable. We further observe that timing of 
investment is highly significant for ownership mode choice at p≤0.01 level. The regression 
coefficient for the timing of investment variable shows that FDIs made later in the sample 
economies tend to be WOSs, while earlier FDIs (i.e. during the 1990s) tend to be more JVs. 
Some previous studies also found that MNEs prefer formation of JVs in transition economies 
during the early stages of transition (e.g. Peng, 2003; Meyer, 2004). The host countries in our 
sample from the CIS and SEE were in the early stages of transition during the 1990s and 
there were also restrictions in many cases on foreign ownership (Bitzenis, 2009 Aslund, 
2012), therefore it is understandable that Nordic MNEs formed JVs with local partners. Later, 
when the host countries stabilised to a certain extent and developed economically as well as 
institutionally, preference of WOSs formation increased by Nordic MNEs. Finally, the 
country dummies also show that both Finnish and Swedish MNEs tended to prefer JVs more 
than WOSs.  
 
The detailed analysis produced by dividing the sample into FDIs made in Russia vs. FDIs 
made in other transitional periphery economies shows some interesting findings. Model 2 in 
Table 4 shows the regression outputs for FDIs made in Russia, where the results are similar 
to the results of the full sample. Model 3 in Table 4 shows the regression results for FDIs 
made in other transitional periphery economies excluding Russia. Here, the results seem to 
differ from the regression results for the full sample and FDIs in Russia. Economic growth 
which was significant in both Model 1 and 2 is non-significant here, and cultural distance 
becomes mildly significant at p≤0.1 level. The regression coefficients depict that high 
cultural distance between Nordic countries and host countries in the transitional periphery 
economies (excluding Russian Federation) lead to the preference of JVs formation by the 
Nordic MNEs. It has been mentioned in past IB studies that the MNEs operating in culturally 
distant host countries require greater flexibility in their operations (Brouthers; 2002; Larimo 
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and Arslan, 2013). The formation of JVs offered Nordic MNEs a viable option to commit 
fewer resources and consequently reduce the risk (Kogut and Singh, 1988; Tihanyi et al., 
2005).  
 
Finally, economic freedom distance is significant at p≤0.01 level in all three models. The 
regression coefficients depict that Nordic MNEs preferred the formation of JVs in host 
countries with large economic freedom distance. This result is in line with Hypothesis 2 and 
hence, we accept it. It has been mentioned earlier that transitional periphery economies 
increase uncertainty for investing MNEs due to problems associated with institutional 
infrastructure (low levels of economic freedom) as well socioeconomic dynamics (Demekas 
et al., 2007; Aslund, 2012; Estrin and Uvalic, 2013, 2014). Therefore, formation of JVs with 
local partners by Nordic MNEs can be helpful to counter this uncertainty and ambiguity that 
arise from high economic freedom distance. Moreover, JVs are expected to be helpful to 
overcome unfamiliarity hazards (Demirbag et al., 2011) for Nordic MNEs in transitional 
periphery economies. Moreover, high economic freedom distance also increases operational 
and establishment costs for investing Nordic MNEs, and JV formation can be helpful to share 
these costs with established and reliable local partners. JV formation in transitional periphery 
economies with high economic freedom distance is expected to help investing Nordic MNEs 
to establish relations with key local players (e.g. Kobernyuk et al., 2014) and try to align their 
interests with those of the host governments (Meyer 2002, 2004; Chen et al., 2009). 
 
5. DISCUSSION, IMPLICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
 
This paper is one of the first studies to address both establishment and ownership mode 
strategies of MNEs together in the context of FDIs made by Nordic MNEs in a relatively 
unique context of the transitional periphery economies of the EU. The key independent 
variable of the study (economic freedom distance) attempts to address market entry specific 
institutional development in the host transition economies. Our study uses a number of 
control variables at firm, industry and country level to enhance reliability of the study 
findings. The study results revealed that some variables are only significant for one or other 
of the establishment or ownership mode strategies (e.g. host country experience and cultural 
distance for establishment mode, while parent MNE size and timing of investment for 
ownership mode). However, some variables like host country risk, economic growth in host 
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country and economic freedom distance (independent variable) are significant for both 
strategies. The results revealed that in high risk host countries of the transitional periphery, 
Nordic MNEs preferred partial acquisition, while in high economic growth host countries, 
they preferred full acquisition. It is important to mention that some important variables like 
industry R&D intensity and product diversity are non-significant for both establishment and 
ownership mode strategies. This shows that FDIs by Nordic MNEs in the transitional 
periphery were not driven by knowledge seeking motives, but rather they wanted to take 
advantage of market opportunities and low production costs. Finally, high economic freedom 
distance leads to a preference for greenfield JVs by Nordic MNEs, as we predicted in the 
study hypotheses.  
 
These study findings have important implications for both theory and practice. The 
theoretical contribution of our study stems from the application and empirical testing of the 
economic freedom distance construct in the context of FDI entry strategies of MNEs from 
small, open and highly internationalized Nordic economies in the transitional periphery of the 
EU. It has been established in IB literature that internationalization and FDI strategies of 
these Nordic MNEs tend to differ from the MNEs from large economies like USA, Japan, 
UK and Germany (e.g. Larimo 2003; Larimo and Arslan 2013). Moreover, the transitional 
periphery of the EU (see e.g. Totev, 2002; Barry, 2004; Galego et al., 2004; Balkir et al., 
2013) has been an under-researched area in IB studies, as most studies tend to concentrate on 
the CEE region in general, where Baltic states, as well as Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, 
Slovakia and Slovenia have been successful in transition to a market economy, and differ 
significantly from transitional periphery economies. Our study attempts to fill this research 
gap, and contributes to extant IB literature by analysing both establishment and ownership 
mode strategies together in this specific context. Our study offers implications for a 
managerial audience. In particular, managers of Nordic MNEs as well as those from other 
small, open and high internationalised European economies (e.g. Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Austria) aiming to invest especially in the manufacturing sector in the transitional periphery 
of CIS and SEE can gain useful insights from the paper. Based on the study results 
concerning control variables, it appears that although establishment and ownership mode 
strategies are related decisions for MNEs expanding to new markets via FDI mode, the study 
variables have different levels of significance for these strategies in the specific context of 
transitional periphery host economies. Therefore, the managers need to concentrate more on 
their previous host country experience (if any), host country risk and economic growth, and 
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cultural distance in order to devise a viable establishment mode strategy. On the other hand, 
investing MNE size, host country risk and economic growth deserve special attention from 
managers in order to amicably address the challenges concerning ownership mode strategy in 
transitional periphery economies.  
 
Moreover, it is also important for the managers to consider the within-sample variance in the 
transition periphery economies because a large economy like the Russian Federation has 
certain attributes that differ from those in small host economies like Serbia for example. As 
transitional periphery economies represent different and relatively unstable institutional 
environments compared to the home countries of Nordic MNEs, these differences may result 
in high uncertainty in decision making for managers. In response to this high uncertainty and 
large economic freedom distance, MNE managers can benchmark successful peer firms (from 
same background/operating in same industry) in a particular host economy, and mimic their 
FDI strategies at the time of market entry. 
 
Our paper does have certain limitations. Firstly, our study separately analyses FDI 
establishment and ownership mode strategies using binomial logistic regression. However, in 
future studies multinomial regression could be used to analyse the influences of economic 
freedom on four categorical dependent variables (partial acquisition, greenfield JV, full 
acquisition and greenfield WOS). Such an analysis would enhance our understanding of FDI 
entry strategies in less researched regions of the CIS and SEE.  Moreover, this paper only 
addresses the direct influences of economic freedom distance on FDI establishment and 
ownership strategy. The future studies could incorporate the potential moderating influences 
of firm level factors like experience, size, as well as country level factors like candidacy for 
EU membership on these FDI entry strategies of MNEs in the transitional periphery of the 
CIS and SEE. Finally, future studies have a possibility to address the concept of transitional 
periphery economies located next to developed economies with strong institutions, in other 
regions of the world. Therefore, it can be very insightful, if similar studies are undertaken in 
the context of central and North America, and Southeast Asia, where economies in transition 
are geographically located next to developed market economies, offering an interesting 
research avenue. 
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Appendix 1: Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlations 
 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean Std.dev 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 
 
15. 
1. Establishment mode 0.47 0.50 1               
2. Ownership Mode 
0.37 0.48 -0.207* 1           
   
3. Economic freedom 
distance 3.52 1.11 -0.127* 0.304* 1          
   
4. Industry R&D Intensity 
1.43 0.60 0.065 -0.058 -0.248* 1         
   
5. Parent firm diversification 
10.34 9.56 0.215* -0.111 -0.194* 0.142* 1        
   
6. International experience of 
investing MNE 44.52 43.40 0.182* -0.041 -0.185* 0.083 0.786* 1       
   
7. Host country experience 
of investing MNE 3.35 3.84 0.023 0.108 0.074 -0.127 0.233* 0.307* 1      
   
8. Parent MNE size 
6.64 1.99 0.019 -0.118 -0.111 0.010 0.073 0.090 -0.004 1     
   
9. Host country risk 
42.17 13.04 -0.085 0.266* 0.224* -0.185* -0.204* -0.054 0.114 -0.004 1    
   
10. Economic size of host 
country 3611.0.3 2488.86 0.013 0.113 0.140* 0.010 -0.045 -0.034 0.289* -0.032 0.237* 1   
   
11. Economic growth in host 
country -1.17 6.89 -0.097 0.155* 0.273* -0.192* -0.168* -0.060 0.214* -0.106* 0.577* 0.442* 1  
   
12. Timing of investment 
9.44 4.94 0.034 -0.307* -0.328* 0.209* 0.242* 0.075 -0.219* 0.021 -0.628* -0.484* 0.630* 1 
   
13. Cultural distance 
3.94 1.37 -0.024 -0.145* -0.043 0.151* 0.003 0.126 -0.194* 0.070 -0.117 -0.257* -0.228* 0.208* 
 
1 
  
14. Finland dummy 
0.41 0.49 -0.093 0.228* 0.080 -0.144* -0.199* -0.279* 0.185* -0.037 0.143* 0.238* 0.260* -0.262* 
 
0.563* 
 
1 
 
 
15. Sweden dummy 
0.30 0.458 0.063 -0.016 -0.098 0.057 0.207* 0.304* -0.081 -0.022 -0.084 -0.282* -0.247 0.272* 
 
0.437* 
 
-0.037 
 
1 
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Table 1 - Control Variables 
VARIABLES OPERATIONALIZATION  REFERENCE(S) 
1. Industry R&D 
intensity 
A classification of 4-digit industry SIC Codes 
into three categories (low tech, medium tech 
and high tech) based on their value added 
figures. 
 Hennart and Larimo (1998); 
Chen and Hennart (2004); 
Demirbag et al. (2009) 
 
2. Parent firm 
diversification 
The number of 4-digit SIC codes in which the 
company was operating based on the annual 
reports and websites of the firms. 
 
 Hennart and Larimo (1998); 
Vermeulen and Barkema 
(2001); Larimo (2003) 
 
3. International 
experience of the 
investing MNE 
The number of foreign manufacturing 
investments made by the MNE. 
 Larimo (2003); Kaynak et al. 
(2007) 
 
4. Host country 
experience of the 
investing MNE 
The experience in years from the first 
manufacturing investment of the firm in the 
host country. 
 Hennart and Park (1993); Cho 
and Padmanabhan (1995); 
Hennart and Larimo (1998); 
Larimo (2003); Cho and 
Padmanabhan (2005) 
 
5. Parent MNE Size 
 
Natural log of global sales of the parent MNE 
in the year before investment changed to 
Euros.  
 
 Vermeulen and Barkema 2001; 
Larimo, 2003; Demirbag et al. 
(2008). 
6. Host country risk 
 
Euromoney country risk index (scale 
1 for very high risk and 100 for extremely low 
risk; 100 minus the risk index value is used in 
the statistical analysis). 
 
 Cosset and Roy (1991), Click 
(2005); Arslan and Larimo 
(2011) 
7. Economic size of host 
country 
Economic size of the host country 
based on the total GDP in the year of the 
investment (UNCTAD) 
 Hennart and Larimo (1998); 
Vermeulen and Barkema 
(2001); Larimo (2003); 
Demirbag et al. (2008, 2009). 
 
8. Economic growth of 
host country 
Economic growth (% of GDP growth) in the 
host country of the investment in the year 
preceding the investment. 
 Hennart (1991); Brouthers and 
Brouthers (2000); Arslan and 
Larimo (2010, 2011) 
 
9. Timing of investment 2009 minus the year of investment.  Harzing (2002); Demirbag et al. 
(2009) 
 
 
10. Cultural Distance Cultural distance is measured by the Kogut & 
Singh (1988) composite index, which is based 
on difference between Nordic countries and 
host countries along four dimensions of culture 
identified by Hofstede (1980). 
 Brouthers and Brouthers (2000); 
Larimo (2003); Ruiz-Moreno et 
al. (2007) 
 
11. Finland Dummy 0= FDIs made by MNEs from other Nordic 
countries; 1= FDIs made by Finnish MNEs 
 - 
    
12. Sweden Dummy 0= FDIs made by MNEs from other Nordic 
countries; 1= FDIs made by Swedish MNEs 
 - 
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Table 2 - Summary of Sample Characteristics 
 
Sample Characteristic Description 
Establishment Mode Choice 184 (52.9%) greenfield investments, 164 (47.1%) acquisitions of local firms. 
Ownership Mode Choice 220 (63.2%) JVs, 128 (36.8%) WOSs. 
FDIs by MNEs from a 
particular Nordic country  
Finland: 142 FDIs (40.8%) 
Sweden: 103 FDIs (29.6%) 
Denmark: 45 FDIs (12.9%) 
Norway:  58 FDIs (16.7%) 
International Experience of 
investing firms 
Average: 44.52 international investments. Minimum 1 (first) international investment. 
Maximum: 168 international investments. 
Host Country Experience of 
Investing Firms 
Average: 3.35 years. Minimum: 0 years (No earlier FDI in the host country). Maximum: 
26 years. 
Number of FDIs in particular 
host country 
Belarus (3), Bosnia (1), Bulgaria (14), Croatia (14), Georgia (1), Kazakhstan (8), Romania 
(37), Russian Federation (226), Serbia (6), Ukraine (36) and Uzbekistan (2). 
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Table 3 - Binomial logistic regression estimates of establishment mode strategy 
 (acquisition = 1) 
Variable Model 1: Full 
sample 
Model 2: FDIs 
in Russia  
Model 3: FDIs 
in other 
countries 
Industry R&D intensity 0.440 -0.319 0.242 
Parent firm diversification 0.029 0.043 0.001 
International experience of investing MNE 0.002 -0.005 0.011 
Host country experience of investing MNE 0.23** 0.45* 0.104* 
Parent MNE Size -0.190 0.018 -0.288 
Host country risk -0.115* -0.32* 0.008 
Economic size of host country 0.004 0.001 0.004 
Economic growth in host country 0.28** 0.56** 0.45** 
Timing of investment -0.062 -0.117 -0.006 
Cultural distance -0.325** -0.851** -0.253** 
Finland dummy 0.686* -1.459** 0.823* 
Sweden dummy 0.158 0.769 -0.617 
Economic freedom distance -0.161** -0.219** -0.126* 
N (Acquisitions) 348 (164) 226 (94) 122 (70) 
Model χ2 36.943*** 31.393*** 23.297** 
–2 log likelihood 444.338 275.489 153.166 
Nagelkerke R2 0.164 0.175 0.169 
Correctly classified (%) 65.7 66.4 66.4 
    Levels of Significance: *p≤ 0.1, **p≤ 0.05, ***p≤0.01 
 
Table 4 - Binomial logistic regression estimates of ownership mode strategy (WOS = 1) 
 
Variable Model 1: 
Full Sample 
Model 2: 
FDIs in 
Russia 
Model 3: 
FDIs in other 
countries 
Industry R&D intensity -0.377 -0.314 -0.322 
Parent firm diversification 0.018 0.019 0.026 
International experience of investing MNE -0.007 -0.005 -0.004 
Host country experience of investing MNE 0.001 -0.005 0.034 
Parent MNE Size 0.124* 0.240*** -0.23 
Host country risk -0.33** -0.69*** 0.018 
Economic size of host country 0.030 0.40 0.010 
Economic growth in host country 0.71** 0.144*** -0.03 
Timing of investment -0.109*** -0.126* -0.159** 
Cultural distance -0.100 0.797 -0.150* 
Finland dummy -1.684*** 0.195 -1.567** 
Sweden dummy -0.983*** -0.961* -1.324*** 
Economic freedom distance -0.567*** -0.579*** -0.728*** 
N (WOS) 348 (128) 226 (88) 122(40) 
Model  χ2 89.932*** 78.929*** 29.570*** 
–2 log likelihood 367.885 223.219 124.799 
Nagelkerke R2 0.311 0.400 0.300 
Correctly classified (%) 71.8 71.7 73.0 
    Levels of Significance: *p≤ 0.1, **p≤ 0.05, ***p≤0.01 
